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CHALLENGING THE 
EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL DOCTRINE 
THROUGH MODERN CONTRACT THEORY 
Most American employees believe that competent work performance 
will secure job continuity in a stable economy. 1 This belief is often 
engendered by promises of job security and deferred benefits that 
employers use to recruit and maintain a cooperative work force. 2 Con-
sequently, arbitrary discharge creates severe financial and emotional 
hardships for employees who have relied on express or implied assur-
ances of job security. 3 
By legitimizing arbitrary discharge, the traditional rule of at-will 
employment allows employers to def eat employee reliance on promises 
of job security. Under the at-will doctrine, the employer may fire the 
employee for any reason, notwithstanding promises of just cause dis-
charge. 4 To avoid arbitrary discharge, employees must provide their 
employers with consideration, such as a monetary contribution, prop-
erty transfer, or other financial benefit, arising independently of their 
jobs. 5 Only after providing such "independent" consideration have 
I. Note, Job Security for the At Will Employee: Contractual Right of Discharge for Cause, 
56 CH1.[-]KENT L. REv. 697, 728 (1981) ("Where the employee has completed a task acording 
[sic] to his employer's standards, he has earned the right not to be discharged.") [hereinafter 
cited as Note, Job Security]; Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. REV. 
335, 363 (1974) ("An employee who is told by the employer that his or her work is satisfactory 
may reasonably expect job security.") [hereinafter cited as Note, Implied Contract Rights]; see 
also Murg & Scharman, Employment at Will: Do the Exceptions Overwhelm the Rule?, 23 B.C.L. 
REV. 329, 369 (1982) (noting that most employers promise non-unionized workers job security). 
2. Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 408 Mich. 579, 619, 292 N.W.2d 880, 
895 (1980) (presuming that employers use promises of job security to promote good morale and 
productivity); see also Murg & Scharman, supra note I, at 370-71 (discharge for good cause 
encourages employee morale and workforce stability). 
3. See generally WORK IN AMERICA: REPORT OF A SPECIAL TASK FORCE TO THE SECRETARY 
OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE 8 (1973) (analyzing socio-economic consequences of 
unemployment) [hereinafter cited as WORK IN AMERICA); Blades, Employment at Will vs. In-
dividual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 
1404, 1413 (1967) (discussing personal ramifications of being discharged). 
4. See, e.g., Payne v. Western & Atl. R.R. Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884) (employer may 
discharge "for good cause, for no cause or even for cause morally wrong .... "). See also 
Bender Ship Repair, Inc. v. Stevens, 379 So. 2d 594 (Ala. 1980) (holding that employer may 
discharge for any reason, good or bad); Jones v. Keogh, 409 A.2d 581 (Vt. 1979) (stating that 
employer may use bad faith, malice, or retaliation as reason of discharge). See generally Note, 
Reforming At-Will Employment Law: A Model Statute, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 389, 390-94 (1983). 
5. Traditionally the courts have viewed the employment relationship as a simple exchange 
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employees been able to enforce employer promises of job security. 6 
Most employees relying on employer promises of job security are 
unaware of the independent-consideration requirement. 7 Such employees 
simply rely on employers to honor these promises, and assume that 
satisfactory job performance will be rewarded with continued employ-
ment. In any other commercial setting these employer promises would 
create binding contractual obligations; in the employment setting, 
however, they have not been viewed as legally binding. 8 This anomaly 
exemplifies the injustice of the at-will rule. 
This Note advocates an implied contract analysis that both satisfies 
contractual requirements and protects the reasonable expectations of 
employees and employers. Part I describes the various reliance interests 
that employees bring to their jobs, the employer inducements that cause 
this reliance, and the business benefits that accrue when employees rely 
upon these inducements. Part II examines in detail judicial reluctance 
to enforce either these reliance interests or employer promises as contract 
rights under the at-will doctrine. Part II also urges the increased use 
of modern contract theories such as promissory estoppel, quasi-contract, 
and implied contract to protect employee reliance interests and expec-
tations of job security. This Note concludes that when an employer 
pursues business policies that encourage expectations of job security, 
a just cause guarantee should be enforced. 
of a day's work for a day's pay. See Murg & Scharman, supra note I, at 337. To contract 
out of the at-will setting the employee had to exchange some consideration, beside mere labor, 
that would support a separate contractual obligation. See, e.g., Chatelier v. Robertson, 118 So. 
2d 241 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960) (barring the arbitrary discharge of an employee who sold 
his business to his employer in exchange for a promise of permanent employment); Carnig v. 
Carr, 167 Mass. 544, 46 N.E. 117 (1897) (upholding permanent employment contract where 
employee had given up his business to work for employer with identical business). See also Note, 
Implied Contract Rights, supra note I, at 351 (Because nineteenth-century contract law viewed 
employees as exchanging "their labor and services for the salary they earned, if they wanted 
added job security, they had to pay the employer additional consideration to make their arrange-
ment mutual and binding.") (citations omitted); Note, supra note 4, at 392. The indpendent-
consideration requirement is discussed more fully infra notes 70-81 and accompanying text. 
6. See, e.g., Chatelier v. Robertson, 118 So.2d 241, 244 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960). 
7. In a tight job market and with the inherent inequality of bargaining power that characterizes 
most employment relationships, see infra notes 12 & 42, it is hardly surprising that employees 
do not inquire extensively into the technical matters of the employment contract. See Blades, 
supra note note 3, at 1410-13. 
8. In the context of commercial contracts, courts often imply terms requiring that 
a contract's duration be for some reasonble period or that it be terminated only in 
good faith . . . . The at will rule, however, creates the illusion that the employer 
and employee have already worked out the problems of job security in their mutual 
best interests before any dispute arises. It seems paradoxical that courts should take 
these assumptions for granted in the employment context but adopt a more flexible 
position when dealing with commercial contracts. 
Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only 
in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1816, 1832-33 (1980). 
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I. EMPLOYER INDUCEMENT OF EMPLOYEE RELIANCE AND EXPECTATIONS 
American workers harbor a variety of expectations regarding their 
jobs. They typically expect fair treatment, adequate compensation, and 
a safe working environment. Some of these expectations are guaranteed 
by laws such as the civil rights legislation9 and the occupational safety 
and health standards. 10 Job security, however, is one important expec-
tation not yet guaranteed by law. 11 Unless a worker can contract out 
of the common law employment-at-will doctrine, the employer retains 
unfettered discretion to terminate the employment relationship. 12 
Employers who strive to improve productivity by inducing employee 
reliance on express or implied promises of job security should not be 
allowed to practice arbitrary discharges simultaneously. An examination 
of these employer inducements and employee interests will illustrate 
injustices prevalent in at-will relationships. 
A. Employee Reliance 
American workers expect and rely upon continuous employment for 
a variety of reasons. Job security provides a multitude of benefits to 
employees, from economic stability and the opportunity to plan for 
the future, to self-esteem and a sense of order. 13 Occupation and 
employer affiliation are normally focal points of self-identity; working 
people often describe themselves in terms of their livelihoods. 14 The 
societal advantages of steady employment are also enormous, as work 
contributes to family and community stability. 1 s 
Although each of these interests is an important factor in promoting 
employee expectations of continuous employment, perhaps the most 
9. See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 
& Supp. IV 1980). 
10. See, e.g., Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976). 
11. See generally Note, supra note 4, at 394-403. 
12. See St. Antoine, You're Fired!, 10 HuM. RTS. 32, 34 (Winter 1982) (Only a "handful" 
of employees have "knowledge or talents ... so unusual and valuable that they have the leverage 
to negotiate a contract for a fixed term with their employer."); supra notes 4-5 and accompany-
ing text. 
13. See WoRK IN AMERICA, supra note 3, at 3-10; cf. Blades, supra note 3, at 1413 (claiming 
that job loss results in mental anguish arising independently of economic concerns). See generally 
Note, Implied Contract Rights, supra note I, at 339 (citing studies of employee self-esteem after 
discharge from employement). 
14. See WoRK IN AMERICA, supra note 3, at 6 ("The question, 'Who are you?', often elicits 
an organizationally related response, such as 'I work for IBM,' or 'I'm a Stanford professor.' 
Occupational role is usually a part of this response for all classes: 'I'm a steelworker,' or 'I'm 
a lawyer.' "). 
15. Cf. id at 5 (unemployment detracts from positive attitudes towards one's community 
and family). 
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influential factor is employer promises of job security. For instance, 
the mere availability of pensions, vacation pay, and related benefits 
implies that workers will remain with their employers long enough to 
realize these deferred benefits. 16 Employer promises thus engender long-
term expectations among employees; consequently, employees often 
forego more immediate rewards. 1 ' 
Def erring immediate rewards is only one of many ways that employees 
may rely to their detriment on employer assurances. For example, 
workers may leave present jobs in reliance on promises of a new job, 
and discover the new jobs no longer available. 18 They may surrender 
injury awards, 19 relinquish jobs, 20 or sell their homes and relocate21 
yet receive nothing in return. They may confer some extra benefit on 
their employers yet receive no guarantees of job continuity. 22 They may 
join pension plans at work, deferring present salary for future financial 
security, and get fired on the eve of vesting. 23 Ironically, many employers 
who def eat these reliance interests are themselves the source of the 
original expectations. 
B. Employer Inducements and Business Benefits 
Given the tenuous nature of employment in the at-will setting, 
16. See Note, Implied Contract Rights, supra note I, at 362 ("Under modern employment 
conditions, longevity often results in the accrual of rights to various fringe benefits that must 
be considered as part of an employee's compensation."). 
17. See id. at 362 ("Fringe benefits can be anaiyzed in market terms: the employee bargains 
for lower present salary in exchange for the promise of future payments."). 
18. See, e.g., Grouse v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 306 N.W.2d 114 (Minn. 1981) (pharmacist 
resigned previous employment in reliance on a job offer from a health clinic but the clinic revoked 
the offer just prior to the starting date); Stern Co. v. Munniks, IOI A.2d 846 (D.C. 1957) (employee 
quit former position to accept new position but offer was rescinded before he began work). 
19. See, e.g., Adkins v. Kelly's Creek R.R. Co., 458 F.2d 26 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 
U.S. 926 (1972); Gainey v. Coker's Pedigreed Seed Co., 227 S.C. 200, 87 S.E.2d 486 (1955). 
20. See, e.g., Rabago-Alvarez v. Dart Indus., Inc., 55 Cal. App. 3d 91, 127 Cal. Rptr. 222 
(1976) (employee agreed to leave her employer of I 7 years because competitor's representatives 
promised her permanent employement); Exercycle Corp. v. Maratta, 9 N.Y.2d 329, 174 N.E.2d 
463 (1961) (employee agreed to give up his work as independent sales consultant to join employer's 
sales department only because of permanent employment offer); cf. O'Neill v. ARA Serv., Inc., 
457 F. Supp. 182 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (employee accepted an offer from his employer's competitor 
in reliance on promise of management position after two years). 
21. See, e.g., Skagerberg v. Blandin Paper Co., 197 Minn. 291, 266 N.W. 872 (1936). But 
see McIntosh v. Murphy, 52 Hawaii 29, 469 P.2d 177 (1970) (allowing employee to recover for 
his move to Hawaii in reliance on defendant's job offer). See generally Foley v. Community 
Oil Co., 64 F.R.D. 561 (D.N.H. 1974) (discussing the question of fact presented when an employee 
moved his family at his employer's behest). 
22. See, e.g., Cederstrand v. Lutheran Bhd., 263 Minn. 520, 117 N.W.2d 213 (1962) (employee 
made a loan to the employer); Morris v. Park Newspapers of Georgia, Inc., 149 Ga. App. 674, 
255 S.E.2d 131 (1979) (employee made substantial investment to facilitate her participation in 
employer's operations); Littell v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 120 F.2d 36, 37 (D.C. Cir. 1941) 
(plaintiff developed highly lucrative advertising page for employer's benefit). 
23. See, e.g., Moore v. Home Ins. Co., 601 F.2d 1072 (9th Cir. 1979) (senior employee ar-
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t:mployee willingness to forego present compensation in lieu of unen-
forceable future promises seems ill-advised. Nevertheless, workers are 
often persuaded that arbitrary discharge, though technically available 
to the employer, is never used. Employers realize that the specter of 
random discharge can undermine employee morale and productivity. 24 
Consequently, many employers agressively promote a facade of job 
security. This objective can be accomplished both explicitly and 
implicitly. 
1. Employer Inducements- Express promises of job security are 
the most obvious inducements used by employers. They can take the 
form of recruitment lures or retention perquisites. For instance, in Hope 
v. National Airlines, Inc., 25 an airline facing a crippling strike promised 
a pilot permanent employment in exchange for working during the strike. 26 
He worked through the strike, incurrjng the anger of fellow employees, 
yet was fired after the strike ended. 21 
Some types of employer promises or policies only imply job security. 
Pension and other def erred benefits vest after a certain minimum period 
of continuous employment. 28 The mere availability of these benefits 
implies that satisfactory job performance will lead to continued employment 
and, ultimately, vested rights in these deferred benefits. 29 An employee 
who has contributed to a pension plan thus has considerable incentive 
to remain with the employer until the pension vests. The employer, 
conversely, may have a financial incentive to def eat the vesting of employee 
bitrarily discharged with less than eight months left for pension to vest); Hablas v. Armour 
& Co., 270 F.2d 71 (8th Cir. 1959) (employee discharged arbitrarily one year prior to retirement). 
24. See Murg & Scharman, supra note I, at 372; Note, Job Security, supra note I, at 732. 
25. 99 So.2d 244 (Fla. Dis. Ct. App. 1957). 
26. Id. at 245. 
27. Id. at 246-47. 
28. Under the 1974 Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 
IO0l-1381 (1976), employee pension rights need not fully vest until after the employee has been 
with the employer for a certain number of years. Three qualified vesting schedules exist under 
ERISA. One plan calls for IOOOJo vesting after the employee has worked for IO years. See I.R.C. 
§ 41 I (a)(2)(A) (1976). The second calls for gradual vesting over a 15 year period, generally 
250Jo vesting at 5 years, 500Jo at IO years, and I00OJo vesting after 15 years. See id. § 411 (a)(2)(B). 
The third type, "Rule of 45" vesting, computes the sum of the employee's age and length of 
qualified service; when that is at least 45 and the employee has completed at least five years 
of service, there is a vested right to 500Jo of the accrued benefit. See id. § 41 I (a)(2)(C). All 
three schedules, however, require 500Jo vesting by the tenth year, and IOOOJo by the fifteenth year. 
Employees who quit or are discharged prior to the end of the vesting period are reimbursed 
for any contributions they made to the plan. See id. § 411(2)(1); Treas. Reg. § I.41 l(a)-(l)(A)(2) 
(1981); see also Rev. Rul. 69-277, 1969-1 C.B. I 16 ("Upon 30 days advance notice to the trustee, 
participants are allowed to withdraw their voluntary contributions together with the accumulated 
interest thereon."). Rights to employer contributions, however, are forfeited. See Rev. Ru!. 74-254, 
1974-1 C.B. 91; Rev. Ru!. 56-213, 1956-1 C.B. 194. ERISA does not distinguish between employees 
discharged arbitrarily and those who quit of their own volition. 
29. See Blades, supra note 3, at 1420 (noting that pension benefits induce employees to re-
main with their employers). 
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pensions30 through arbitrary discharge31 and stringent forefeiture provisions. 32 
2. Business Benefits- Assurances of job security are excellent recruiting 
aids for employers seeking a competitive edge in hiring. 33 Job candidates 
may predicate their applications on such assurances, turning down other 
offers lacking similar guarantees. 34 Employers intent on enticing skilled 
employees away from competitors also use promises of permanent 
employment to assuage employee apprehension regarding mid- or late-
career job change. 35 
Job security also minimizes labor turnover. 36 Many employers incur 
significant expense recruiting, selecting, orienting, and placing employees. 37 
Most employers, therefore, have a great incentive to protect their financial 
outlays through promises of job security. 
The occasional arbitrary discharge of an employee is unlikely to jeopardize 
the benefits emanating from collective employee reliance on job security. 
Other employees are likely to regard the firing as aberrant and insignificant 
when a just cause discharge policy otherwise prevails. 38 Unless the firing 
30. Employers often use actuarial formulas to estimate the percentage of employees that will 
remain until their pensions vest. Although employers cannot remove contributions that they have 
paid into a plan, they can redistribute funds forfeited by any arbitrarily discharged employee. 
By arbitrarily discharging employees prior to vesting, employers can manipulate termination deci-
sions in a way that Jowers employer contributions. See Maldonado, How to select acceptable 
actuarial methods for defined benefit pension plans, 57 J. TAX'N 14, 14-18 (1982). 
31. See, e.g., Moore v. Home Ins. Co., 601 F.2d 1072 (9th Cir. 1979) (senior employee 
discharged arbitrarily with less than eight months left for pension to vest); Schneider v. McKesson 
& Robbins, Inc., 254 F.2d 827, 829 (2nd Cir. 1958) (upholding the arbitrary discharge of three 
senior employees and the forfeiture of their pension benefits, maintaining that the pensions were 
"payable only to participants [and) appellants ceased to be participants when they were dis-
charged."); cf. Lucas v. Seagrave Corp., 277 F. Supp. 338 (D. Minn. 1967) (termination of 
a large group of employees may have been motivated by their employer's desire to quash their 
pension benefits). 
32. See, e.g., Robinson v. United Mine Workers Health & Retirement Funds, 640 F.2d 416 
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (denying health benefits to widows of employees who died before applying 
for retirement benefits or before the slated time for retirement) Guay v. The Master Mates & 
Pilots Pension Plan, 432 F. Supp. 135 (1977) (executors of employee who was not retired at 
time of death held without title to his pension benefits). See also Edwards, They're bereft of 
both spouse and pension, Detroit Free Press, March 22, 1983, at Cl, col. I ("About 70,000 
women face the prospect of losing benefits if the working spouse dies too early, before retire-
ment age, according to the Pension Rights Center."). 
33. See Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 408 Mich. 579, 619, 292 N.W.2d 
880, 895 (1980); Murg & Scharman, supra note note I, at 373; Note, Job Security, supra note 
1, at 732. 
34. See, e.g., Moore v. Home Ins. Co., 601 F.2d 1072 (9th Cir. 1979) (employee turned 
down four other job offers to accept employment that offered job security); McKinney v. Na-
tional Dairy Council, 491 F. Supp. 1108 (D. Mass. 1980) (employee forfeited higher paying job 
offer in exchange for employer's promise of permanent employement). 
35. See cases cited supra note 20. 
36. See Note, Treatment of Monetary Fringe Benefits and Post Termination Survival of the 
Right to Job Security, 72 YALE L.J. 162, 166-67 (1962). 
37. Id; see also The Employment-At-Will Issue, 111 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) No. 23, at 25 
(Nov. 22, 1982) (costs for terminating and replacing lower-level supervisors range from upwards 
of $1,000) [hereinafter cited as BNA REPORT]. 
38. Employees do not like to think about being fired, thus they do not dwell on the possibility 
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adversely affects employee relations, the cost to the employer of an 
occasional arbitrary discharge is negligible. 39 
II. CONTRACT-RELATED PROTECTION FOR AT-WILL EMPLOYEES 
Most courts have been reluctant to find any contractual obligation 
of just cause discharge in an at-will employment setting, despite 
employee reliance on express or implied promises of job security. Unless 
a discharged employee can show independent consideration, proffered 
in a traditional mutual bargaining context, no just cause understanding 
will be enforced. 40 Unionized and other organized workers can meet 
these judicial requirements and contract out of the at-will rule through 
collective bargaining negotiations. 41 White-collar and other non-
unionized workers, however, rarely have this opportunity. 42 Until the 
courts become more receptive to protecting reasonable reliance interests 
or finding an enforceable agreement in the implied terms of employ-
ment, at-will employees will remain subject to discharge regardless of 
their performance. The outdated contract technicalities of the at-will 
doctrine should be discarded in favor of modern contract theories that 
protect the reasonable expectations of employers and employees alike. 
A. Traditional Contract Law Protection in the At-Will Setting 
The employment-at-will doctrine evolved in a pre-industrial era, when 
temporary labor was a pragmatic response to seasonal agricultural 
production. 43 Rapid technological change, however, demands radically 
of termination. See Note, supra note 8, at 1831. Employers also contribute to employee mispercep-
tions of job security by promulgating inaccurate or inconsistent policies. Id. Accordingly, employees 
may believe they have a contractual right to job security even in the face of an express disclaimer 
to the contrary. See, e.g., Novosel v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 495 F. Supp 344 (E.D. Mich. 
1980); Hanna v. R.C.A. Serv. Co., 336 F. Supp 62 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Kari v. General Motors 
Corp., 402 Mich. 926, 282 N.W.2d 925 (1978); Schipani v. Ford Motor Co., 102 Mich. App. 
606, 302 N. W.2d 307 (1981). 
39. See Blades, supra note 3, at 1413. But see Brown, Limiting Your Risks in the Russian 
Roulette-Discharging Employees, 8 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 380 (1982) (citing recent cases where 
wrongful-termination suits resulted in millions of dollars in damages). 
40. See infra notes 43-68 and accompanying text. 
41. See 2 COLLECTNE BARGAINING: NEGOTIATIONS & CONT. (BNA) 40:1 (Dec. 28, 1978). It 
is interesting to note how important job security was to union workers during the early 1980's 
auto recession. The United Auto Workers union traded billions of dollars in wage and benefit 
concessions in return for greater job security for its members. See Labor Relations in an Economic 
Recession: Job Losses and Concession Bargaining, I JO LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) No. 23, at 9 (July 
19, 1982). 
42. See, e.g., Blades, supra note 3, at 1411-12 ("Only the unusually valuable employee has 
sufficient bargaining power to obtain a guarantee that he will be discharged during a specific 
term of employment only for 'just cause.' "); accord St. Antoine, supra note 12, at 34. 
43. See generally Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. 
LEGAL HIST. 118, 120 (1976). 
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different employment patterns. 44 Because a stable, skilled work force 
is more conducive to productivity than a changing one, employers now 
recruit and. train with permanency in mind. 45 Consequently, employers 
encourage employees - both tacitly and explicitly - to regard their 
jobs as permanent when satisfactorily performed. 46 
The employment-at-will rule, however, evolved to withhold contrac-
tual force from assurances of job security. 47 Under this analysis, mere 
detrimental reliance or implied promises will not support a contract 
action to enforce just cause guarantees. Rather, employees must prove 
the traditional contract requirements of independent consideration and 
mutuality of obligation, or mutually enforcible promises. 
1. Mutuality of Obligation- Under the traditional at-will analysis, 
employees can quit whenever they want and employers can fire them 
whenever they wish. 48 Courts are reluctant to deviate from this theo-
retically equitable arrangement due to the practical implications of a 
mutual just cause standard. Although employers can be required to 
discharge only for just cause, employees cannot be required to con-
tinue working against their will. 49 Nevertheless, judicial equation of 
a just cause standard with involuntary servitude misinterprets the 
mutuality of obligation requirement. 
Mutuality of obligation does not require the exchange of identical 
promises. so It merely precludes judicial enforcement of gratuitous or 
donative promises in which one party exacts a benefit from another 
party without providing anything in return. 5 1 An employer, therefore, 
can both promise compensation and guarantee just cause discharge 
though receiving only employee services in exchange. 52 Because both 
44. See Note, supra note 4, at 391-94; see also Blades, supra note 3, at 1405. 
45. See Note, Job Security, supra note I, at 338-39. 
46. See, e.g., Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 
880 (1980). 
41. See Note, supra note 8, at 1824 ("Towards the middle of the nineteenth century, however, 
these customary obligations [between master and servant] were recast in terms of the emerging 
theory of contract. The principle consequences of this conceptual change was a drastic limitation 
in the employer's duties to her employee."); see also Note, Job Security, supra note I, at 706 
("Early in the twentieth century the economy was stable and American business was transformed 
from the small shop into the giant industrial complex. The power of the employer over the at-
will employee became awesome."). 
48. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
49. See, e.g., Gollberg v. Bramson Publishing Co., 635 F.2d 224, 228 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding 
that the principle of mutual reciprocity dictated that because the plaintiff-employee could not 
be made to stay with the defendant-employer - the court considered that "specific performance" 
and thus "a form of involuntary servitude" - the employer could not be forced to keep the 
plaintiff in its employ). 
50. See, e.g., Riccardi v. Modern Silver Linen Supply Co., 45 A.D.2d 191, 356 N.Y.S. 2d 
372 (1974). See generally A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 152 (1963 & C. Kaufman Supp. 
1982). 
51. See A. CORBIN, supra note 50, § 152. 
52. See Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 325-26, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917,925 
(1981) ("There is no analytical reason why an employee's promise to render services, or his ac-
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parties have given consideration for the benefits received, and because 
general contract principles discourage judicial inquiry into the adequacy 
of consideration, 53 the mutuality of obligation requirement would be 
fulfilled. 54 
Although employers cannot prohibit employees fr-om quitting, they 
can exact greater consideration from employees in exchange for guar-
antees of just cause discharge. Employers can contract for damages 
which reflect the monetary losses generated by the voluntary departures 
of employees. 55 The employer's right to reasonable reimbursement costs 
would then parallel the monetary remedy available to arbitrarily 
discharged employees. 56 Although these promises still would not be 
coextensive - the employee could insist on reinstatement but the 
employer could not require the employee to return to work - the em-
ployer would not be without a remedy. 
2. Independent consideration- Although mutuality of obligation 
requires neither equal nor independent consideration, most courts regard 
independent consideration and mutuality of obligation as coexistent 
requirements in at-will relationships. Under this traditional analysis, 
independent considerations serve an evidentiary function in establishing 
mutual bargaining, which in turn implies mutuality of obligation. 57 For 
example, prospective employees who confer independent consideration 
on their employers before the relationship commences presumably have 
bargained for a benefit beyond compensation, namely, just cause 
discharge. 58 
Employees who have not given independent consideration to support 
their reliance on personnel policies and handbook provisions have usually 
been unsuccessful in proving an implied contractual right to these 
promises. In McQueeney v. Glenn, 59 the employer's handbook featured 
tual rendition of services over time, may not support an employer's promise both to pay a par-
ticular wage (for example) and to refrain from arbitrary dismissal."). 
53. See generally A. CoRBrN, supra note 50, § 127. 
54. · See Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 325-26, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 924-25 
(1981) (holding that the independent-consideration requirement "is contrary to the general con-
tract principle that courts should not inquire into the adequacy of consideration"). 
55. See, e.g., Wilson v. Clarke, 470 F.2d 1218, 1223 (1st Cir. 1972). 
56. See ABA COMM. ON DEV. THE LAW OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND RESP. IN THE WORK PLACE, 
2 ABA SEC. LAB. & EMPLOYMENT LAW 19. 
51. See, e.g., Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 326, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 
925 (1981) (describing the evidentiary function and noting that "it is more probable that the 
parties intended a continuing relationship, with limitations upon the employer's dismissal authority, 
when the employee has provided some benefit to the employer, or suffers some detriment, beyond 
the usual rendition of service"); see also Comment, Employment at Will and the Law of Con-
tracts, 23 BUFFALO L. REV. 211, 221-26 (1973). 
58. See, e.g., Littell v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 120 F.2d 36, 37 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (holding 
that where an employee promises not only services but also some "additional consideration," 
this "may be sufficient ... to show the intent of the parties to enter into a contract for perma-
nent employment"); accord Chatelier v. Robertson, 118 So.2d 241, 244 (D.C. Fla. 1960). 
59. 400 N.E.2d 306 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1125 (1981). 
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a prov1s1on detailing pre-discharge procedures. 60 When an employee 
was discharged in violation of these procedures, the court held that 
the employer was under no contractual obligation to comply with the 
handbook. 61 Because no mutual bargaining over the handbook terms 
had occurred, the, employer's right to discharge arbitrarily remained 
intact. 62 
When courts fail to give any contractal force to such handbook 
provisions, 63 they ignore employer intentions in proffering written and 
oral assurances to prospective employees. At-will employers make these 
promises for the same reasons that other employers enter into collective 
bargaining agreements - to prevent recurrent haggling over compen-
sation and other terms of employment. 64 Only employers with a limited 
number of personnel can spare the time to bargain individually with 
prospective applicants. For large employers, mutual bargaining is cost-
effective only when recruiting extremely talented, highly compensated 
individuals. 65 
Most modern employment relationships are initiated in accordance 
with pre-existing terms. Employers delegate hiring to personnel managers 
and recruiters who standardize the hiring process through reference 
to these terms. 66 Employee acceptance of unilaterally decided terms 
spares employers the expense and uncertainty of bargaining by allowing 
them to calculate the terms even before the contract is entered. 
Employees indicate their acceptance of these terms simply by render-
ing their services. 67 
Judicial insistence on individualized employer-employee bargaining 
undermines the efficiency found in these arrangements. Nevertheless 
continued enforcement of the at-will rule ignores modern notions of 
detrimental reliance and unilateral contract. By applying these modern 
60. Id. at 810. 
61. Id. at 81 l. 
62. Id. 
63. In the absence of independent consideration, or mutual bargaining, most courts regard 
personnel policies and handbooks as unilateral statements lacking in mutuality of obligation. 
See, e.g., Shaw v. S.S. Kresge Co., 167 Ind. App. l, 328 N.E.2d 775 (1975); Johnson v. Na-
tional Beef Packing Co., 220 Kan. 52, 551 P.2d 779 (1976); Gates v. Life of Mont. Ins. Co., 
638 P.2d 1063 (Mont. 1982) (dictum); Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 83 A.D.2d 810, 442 N.Y.S.2d 
ll (1981). 
64. See Note, Job Security, supra note l, at 726-27; see also Note, supra note 8, at 1830 
("[l)ndividualized bargaining is impractical because negotiating with a large number of employees 
in a firm and maintaining adequate records of job security terms involve high administrative 
costs."). 
65. See supra note 42. 
66. See Note, supra note 8, at 1830-31. 
67. See Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 408 Mich. 579, 630, 292 N.W.2d 
880, 900 (1980) ("[f]he typical employment agreement is unilateral in nature. Generally, the employer 
makes an offer or promise which the employee accepts by performing the act upon which the 
promise is expressly or impliedly based. The employer's promise constitutes, in essence, the terms 
of the employment agreement .... "). 
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contract doctrines and eschewing the artificial analysis often found in 
the independent-consideration cases, 68 courts could protect workers from 
arbitrary discharge while avoiding the inefficiency of individual 
bargaining. 
B. Emerging Contract Law Protection in At-Will Setting 
A variety of modern contract approaches can be used to protect 
employees in at-will settings. Reasonable reliance losses, not sufficient 
to support a contract, can be recouped under promissory estoppel. 
Employers unjustly enriched by retaining the vested benefits of dis-
charged employees can be forced to relinquish such windfalls in quasi-
contract actions. Finally, job security promises made by employers for 
business reasons can be enforced as implied contract terms that abrogate 
the at-will rule. 
1. Promissory estoppel-Vnder the equitable doctrine of promis-
sory estoppel a promisor who has induced reasonable reliance may not 
deny that a contract was made when the non-enforcement of the promise 
would cause injustice to the promisee. 69 Although bargained-for con-
sideration is a traditional contractual prerequisite, unbargained-for 
reliance frequently is regarded as the equivalent of consideration under 
a promissory estoppel analysis. 10 
Promissory estoppel has gained limited judicial acceptance in arbitrary 
discharge cases. 71 Courts endorsing this doctrine have set certain 
guidelines for its application in at-will relationships. For instance, an 
employee's subjective expectation of discharge for just cause will not 
constitute the necessary unbargained-for reliance. 72 An employer must 
have known or reasonably expected that its promise would induce a 
substantial change of position by the employee. 73 
68. Courts and commentators have recognized the unjustifiable results that stem from the 
overly wooden mutuality of obigation requirement. See, e.g., Drzewiecki v. H. & R. Block, Inc., 
24 Cal. App. 3d 695, 704, IOI Cal. Rptr. 169, 174 (1972) (urging courts to "avoid mechanical 
and arbitrary tests" in the employment setting and to focus on the intentions of the parties 
and the circumstances under which the agreement was made); Note, Job Security, supra note 
I, at 705 (noting that mutuality of obligation is being displaced by closer attention to considera-
tion ancf that the definition of consideration in § 75 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
has been entended to unilateral and bilateral promises such as often arise in the employment setting). 
69. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1970). 
70. Id.; see also A. CORBIN, supra note 50, §§ 193 & 196A. 
71. See Fuchs, Promissory Estoppel and Employment Agreements, 49 N.Y. ST. B.J. 386, 
390 (1977) (noting the haphazard application of the doctrine, "especially when dealing with employ-
ment agreements"); Comment, supra note 57, at 235 (noting that uneven application of§ 90, 
particularly in employment decisions, often occurs because "what is unjust to one court may 
seem nothing more than a bad bargain to another"). 
72. See Schwartz v. Michigan Sugar Co., 106 Mich. App. 471, 308 N.W.2d 459 (1981); Roberts 
v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 88 Wash. 2d 887, 568 P.2d 764 (1977). 
73. See Fuchs, supra note 71, at 390. 
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For example, in Grouse v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 74 a pharmacist 
resigned his previous employment in reliance on a job offer from a 
health clinic. 75 When the clinic revoked its offer just prior to the starting 
date, the pharmacist sued for damages resulting from his detrimental 
reliance on the offer. 76 The clinic argued that an employee terminated 
a day before work is scheduled to begin should not be able to claim 
promissory estoppel when this doctrine is not available to an employee 
terminated the day after work begins. 77 The court rejected this defense, 
maintaining that promissory estoppel may be operative even after 
employment has begun. 78 
The estoppel doctrine is particularly adaptable to employment-at-will 
because it measures damages in the absence of explicit, contractual 
terms. 79 If the employee would have been hired at will, damages ought 
to be limited to financial outlays or opportunity costs incurred in 
detrimental reliance on the employer's assurances. 80 If, however, the 
employer's practices imply just cause protection for its employees, the 
court should futher include a measure of lost wages in its calculation 
of reliance damages. 81 
2. Quasi-contract- Unjust enrichment is a quasi-contractual remedy 
that requires one who has wrongfully procured services or money at 
the expense of another to make restitution. 82 Because certain fringe 
and def erred benefits constitute compensation under the at-will rule, 83 
courts have allowed arbitrarily discharged employees recovery in quasi-
contract. 84 Under this theory, employers who cause the forfeiture of 
these benefits through the arbitrary discharge of the intended recipients 
74. 306 N.W.2d 114 (Minn. 1981). 
75. Id. at 115. 
76. Id. at I 16. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. 
79. See Stern Co. v. Munniks, IOI A.2d 846, 847 (D.C. 1954) (Employee quit former position 
to accept new job but offer was rescinded before he began work. Although the contract did 
not specify term of employment, the court awarded the employee one month's salary, asserting 
that "the parties contemplated at least one month's employment."); see also Rowe v. Noren 
Pattern & Foundry Co., 91 Mich. App. 254, 283 N.W.2d 713 (1979) (Employee left long-standing 
job to accept new job offer but was fired two days before the end of a probation period of 
which he had not been informed. To avoid injustice to the employee the court interpn!ted the 
probation period as a term of employment.). 
80. See, e.g., Grouse v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 306 N.W.2d 114, 116 (Minn. 1981) 
("Since ... the prospective employment might have been terminated at any time, the measure 
of damage is not so much what [the employee] would have earned from respondent as what 
he lost in quitting the job he held and in declining at least one other offer of employment 
elsewhere."). 
81. See generally Harrison, Wrongful Discharge: Toward a More Efficient Remedy, 56 IND. 
L.J. 207 (1980-81). 
82. See A. CORBIN, supra note 50, § 19. 
83. See Note, Implied Contract Rights, supra note I, at 362; Note, supra note 36, at 166. 
84. See, e.g., Fredericks v. Georgia-Pac. Corp., 331 F. Supp. 422 (E.D. Pa. 1971). 
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are unjustly enriched and must return their undeserved gains. 85 
Promises of just cause discharge have not been upheld in quasi-
contract. Courts have allowed employees to recover deferred benefits 
but simultaneously have denied them damages resulting from arbitrary 
discharge. 86 The disparate treatment of these respective promises reflects 
the at-will notion that the employer owes the employee only compen-
sation. 87 It also reflects the difficulty of quantifying the fiscal benefit 
that an employer receives as a result of a discharged employee's past 
reliance on a just cause discharge policy. Moreover, mere unjust enrichment, 
in the absence of any bilateral intent to contract, cannot support a 
formal contract. 88 Accordingly, quasi-contract is effective only when 
recovery of deferred benefits is the desired goal. 
3. Implied contract terms- An implied contract analysis recognizes 
that a contractual obligation may exist between two parties even in 
the absence of a formal or written contract. 89 In at-will relationships, 
however, most courts will not imply contractual intent for terms other 
than compensation in the absence of independent consideration. 90 This 
judicial rationale is based on the presumption that an employer would 
not promise compensation and guarantee just cause discharge unless 
the employee provided some beneift in addition to services rendered. 91 
Employers can, however, realize independent consideration of their own 
design through the unilateral formulation of optimal terms. 92 Due to 
their unequal bargaining power, employees cannot negotiate these 
terms. 93 Nevertheless, by accepting employment and rendering services, 
employees demon_strate their acceptance and consequent reliance on 
these terms. 94 
Employers who induce reasonable employee reliance with express or 
implied promises of job security should not be entitled to assert lack 
of independent consideration as a defense to implied contract actions. 
Recognizing the benefits that at-will employers gain from illusory 
promises, some courts have held that an employer's express or implied 
policies may constitute an implied contract for just cause discharge. 95 
This implied contract remedy better comports with contract law than 
85. See Note, supra note 36, at 167. 
86. See, e.g., Gram v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 81 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2287, 429 N,E,2d 21 (1981). 
87. See supra note 5. 
88. See A. CORBIN, supra note 50, §§ 19-19A. 
89. A. CORBIN, supra note 50, § 18. 
90. See supra notes 57-68 and accompanying text. 
91. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text. 
92. See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text. 
93. See supra notes 42 and accompanying text. 
94. See supra notes 67 and accompanying text. 
95. See, e.g., Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981); 
Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., I I I Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980); Toussaint 
v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980). 
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a superficial determination based solely on the presence or absence of 
independent consideration. 96 This approach thus represents an essential 
judicial reform. 
Under an implied contract analysis, employees need not provide ad-
ditional consideration through their own initiative. For example, in 
Toussaint v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Michigan, 97 the Michigan 
Supreme Court vindicated an employee's reliance on oral and written 
assurances that satisfactory job performance would ensure continuity 
of employment Toussaint acknowledged the benefits the employer, Blue 
Cross, enjoyed through its calculated promise of job security. 98 Blue 
Cross sought to procure not only Toussaint's services, but the con-
tinuity of his services. 99 Because Blue Cross intentionally induced Tous-
saint's reliance on the job security promise, the court found an implied 
contract of just cause discharge. 100 
The California courts have acknolwedged that an employer's promise 
of just cause discharge can be supported by an employee's performance 
of services over time. 101 Employers who arbitrarily discharge in con-
travention of such promises violate an "implied-in-law covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing." 102 The arbitrary discharge of an employee 
with eighteen years of service breached this covenant in Cleary v. 
American Airlines, Inc., 103 because the employer's de facto policies 
evidenced a promise to terminate only for just cause. 104 California also 
has recognized "implied-in-fact" promises of just cause discharge on 
the basis of employer communications of job security, longevity of 
employment, and discharge policies common to the industry of the 
employer. 105 
The Supreme Court also uses the "common law of the job" as an 
evidentiary standard in breach of implied contract actions. 106 Although 
this standard traditionally has been used to imply terms missing from 
96. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
97. 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980). 
98. Id. at 619, 292 N.W.2d at 895. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. at 614-15, 292 N.W.2d at 892-93. 
IOI. See, e.g., Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311,326, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 
925 (1981); Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 455, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 
729 (1980). 
102. Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., Ill Cal. App. 3d 443,455, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722,729 
(1980); see also Rabago-Alvarez v. Dart Indus., Inc., 55 Cal. App. 3d 91, 127 Cal. Rptr. 222 
(1976); Drzewiecki v. H & R Block, Inc., 24 Cal. App. 3d 695, JOI Cal. Rptr. 169 (1972); Patter-
son v. Philco Corp., 252 Cal. App. 2d 63, 60 Cal. Rptr. I JO (1976). 
103. 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980). 
104. Id. at 456, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729. 
105. See Cancellier v. Federated Dep't Stores, 672 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1982); see also cases 
cited supra note 119. 
106. See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 602 (1972). 
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collective bargaining agreements, 101 the Court has applied it to at-will 
relationships. In Perry v. Sinderman, 108 the Court analyzed a professor's 
assertion of a contractual right to tenure with reference both to the 
employer's handbook provisions and de facto policies. 109 Perry is a 
landmark employment contract decision because it acknowledged that 
an employer's de facto policies may give rise to contractually enforceable 
employee rights. 110 
The Court's analysis in Perry did not indicate which evidentiary stan-
dard should prevail when a disclaimer and de facto policy of just cause 
discharge exist contemporaneously. Nevertheless, some federal and state 
court decisions have held that de facto policies may negate the effect 
of written disclaimers designed to insulate employers from contractual 
liability. 111 In light of these decisions and the Supreme Court's endorse-
ment of the "common law of the job" as an evidentiary standard, 
employers can no longer exercise arbitrary discharge with complete im-
punity. Only when such discharges coincide with de facto policies should 
they be upheld. Because most employers value successful recruitment, 
employee morale, and reduced turnover more than the occasional ex-
ercise of arbitrary discharge, 112 widespread abandonment of just cause 
policies is unlikely. 113 Moreover, implied contract does not infringe on 
employer autonomy to unilaterally promulgate and enforce such stan-
dards in accordance with productivity goals; it simply prevents employers 
from breaking express or implied promises. 
Employers who seek to reduce their liability for breach of implied 
contract should incorporate reasonable grounds for discharge, rather 
107. See Note, Implied Contract Rights, supra note I, at 360-61. See also Cox, Reflections 
Upon Labor Arbitration, 72 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1498-99 (1959). 
108. 408 U.S. 593 (1972). 
109. Id. at 600. 
I 10. Id. at 602. See generally Note, Implied Contract Rights, supra note I, at 347-50. 356-61. 
Ill. See, e.g., Greene v. Howard Univ., 412 F.2d 1128, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Kari v. General 
Motors Corp., 402 Mich. 926, 282 N.W.2d 925 (1978); Schipani v. Ford Motor Co., 102 Mich. 
App. 606, 302 N.W.2d 307 (1981). 
112. See Murg & Scharman, supra note I, at 372; Note, JojJ Security, supra note I, at 732; 
see also BNA REPORT, supra note 37, at 20. 
113. Some employers arguably need to retain the right to discharge arbitrarily. An employer 
that subcontracts out the services of its employees to clients needing domestic, clerical, or security 
services will not want to retain employees who, for whatever reason, fail to meet the client's 
specifications. See Note, Implied Contract Rights, supra note I, at 359. An employer whose 
economic viability depends upon quick capitalization on popular consumer fads may need a con-
stant influx of new employees for new ventures. An employer in a high turnover industry, with 
easy access to new employees, may have no economic reasons to promote worker continuity. 
See Fleeson, At fast-food chains, the help is low priced, too, Philadelphia Inquirer, Jan. 17, 
1983, at 1, col. 3 (discussing the 3000Jo annual turnover in fast food and the relative ease of 
hiring trainable replacements). 
If an employer values the right of arbitrary dicharge over a stable work force, an express 
disclaimer of job security should be held valid. Because the nature of such businesses is not 
conducive to a de facto policy of just cause discharge, the disclaimer will not mislead the employee. 
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than disclaimers, in employee handbooks. 114 Those who comply with 
these standards will then have an evidentiary advantage in def ending 
against employee lawsuits. 115 
CONCLUSION 
Continued judicial adherence to the employment-at-will doctrine 
ignores the complexity of modern employment relationships. In addi-
tion to compensation, most employers promise job security, def erred 
benefits, and other incentives that facilitate the recruitment and retention 
of employees. Employees accept these promises by rendering their ser-
vices and any subsequent employee reliance on these terms should be 
protected. The most efficient method of protecting such employees 
would be through judicial application of promissory estoppel, quasi-
contract, and unilateral contract. 
Courts should regard arbitrary discharge as a breach of implied 
contract for just cause discharge when de facto employer policies indicate 
an employer's intent to induce and benefit from employee reliance on 
job security promises. By adopting employer policies as the evidentiary 
standard in breach of implied contract actions, courts can safeguard 
reasonable employee expectations without infringing on employer 
autonomy to unilaterally define the employment relationship. More im-
portantly, by eschewing superficial determinations based solely on the 
presence or absence of independent consideration, courts will eliminate 
some of the injustices that modern contract theories were intended to 
reform. 
-Clare Tully 
114. See BNA REPORT, supra note 37, at 20 (claiming that employers could "establish 'a 
wide array' of just cause or good cause reasons for discharge and state these reasons in personnel 
publications"); Note, supra note 8, at 1841 ("[L)egitimate grounds for discharge might include 
incompetence or continued unsatisfactory job performance after warnings and training; clear 
violations of reasonable work rules of which the employee was or should have been aware; 
unauthorized absences; and insubordination."). 
115. See BNA REPORT, supra note 37, at 20 ("The availability of a grievance mechanism, 
along with progressive discipline, would offset the probability of employee suits and 'at the 
very least would assist an employer in arguing in court that it has dealt fairly with employees.' ") 
(quoting Charles G. Bakaly, Jr.); cf. id. at 21 ("[A]n employee who has received more than 
one disciplinary action prior to dismissal has very little chance of success in court .... ") (para-
phrasing Ralph Baxter); Note, supra note 12 at 1842 ("[T)he development of ... what con-
stitutes an unjust discharge will encourage out-of-court settlement of the claims that do arise."). 
